CAB148-30-Defence and Oversea Policy Committee Meetings Relating to 1967 Disturbances-1967 — Page 161

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THE PRIME MINISTER, summing up the discussion, said that the

eventual determination of our military position in the Far East would have to be decided in the light of three factors: budgetary and oversea costs, our own defence requirements and interests and our relations with

our allies, both overall and in the Far East. The conflicting

requirements which arose from these three aspects could not be reconciled at the present stage, but would require further consideration in the light

of the discussion and further examination of the possible courses that

were open to us. In the first instance it would be necessary for the Cabinet to consider whether he might, in his forthcoming discussions with the President of the United States, indicate that we would be willing to

maintain a continuing capability for military action in the Far East after 1975-76. To that end, it would be helpful if the Defence Secretary,

in consultation with the oversea Ministers concerned, would circulate a

paper to the Cabinet in time for their consideration before he left for

the United States. This should set out the military implications and

so far as possible, the cost of our maintaining a military capability for

action in the Far East after this date, based upon facilities in Australia,

or solely upon the United Kingdon, or using facilities maintained by the

Government of Singapore after we had given up our present base and stock- piles there. The paper should also consider whether or not there would be

advantage in offering to base the Polaris submarines East of Suez by that dato (and the implications for NATO of doing so) and the possible

advantage of maintaining a force of Gurkhas on a longer-term basis than

had hitherto been envisaged. After his visit to the United States and

after the discussions with representatives of the Commonwealth countries

concerned later in June, the various courses of action could be considered

in greater detail before decisions were taken by the Cabinet,edobait.

It would be of the utmost importance throughout these discussions to maintain the strictest secrecy in respect of our proposals. The consultations which the Foreign Secretary had held earlier with our

allies during the meeting of the SEATO Council in Washington in April had been gravely embarrassed by leakages of information to the Press inmediately beforehand and these leakages should now be investigated by the Lord

Chancellor.

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